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Richard Rorty (1931–2007) was born in New York City to a family of progressive intellectuals. Shortly after his birth his parents broke with the American Communist Party after realizing how much it was controlled by Moscow. Yet they remained firmly on the left, arguing for economic redistribution and social reform. In an autobiographical essay published in 1992, Rorty writes, “I grew up knowing that all decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at least socialists.”​[1]​
Rorty writes that his political views were formed as a child when, working as an office boy, he read press releases detailing the injustices regularly meted out to labor unions. Yet he also speaks of his having “private, weird, snobbish, incommunicable interests.”​[2]​ These focused initially on collecting wild orchids during childhood summers spent in rural New Jersey, but gradually turned to imaginative literature, in particular to Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past. A theme that runs through his political writings is the relationship between one’s private hopes and one’s public responsibilities. Attending the University of Chicago from the age of fifteen, he writes that: “Insofar as I had any project in mind, it was to reconcile Trotsky and the orchids. I wanted to find some intellectual or aesthetic framework which would let me – in a thrilling phrase which I came across in Yeats – ‘hold reality and justice in a single vision.’”​[3]​
At Chicago he initially sought such a vision in the work of Plato. However, during the course of his undergraduate studies he came to think that the Platonic quest to get “beyond hypotheses” was doomed to failure, because there is no neutral standpoint from which different hypotheses might be evaluated. By the time he moved to Yale to study for a doctorate, Plato had come to be eclipsed in his mind by Hegel. Hegel held that philosophy is “its time held in thought.” For Rorty, this understanding of philosophy suggests that we might draw on the circumstances of our time to “weave the conceptual fabric of a freer, better, more just society.”​[4]​
Rorty received his PhD in 1956. His first academic post was at Wellesley College, where he taught for three years before moving to Princeton University. In early work in the philosophy of mind he was a proponent of “eliminative materialism,” the view that cognitive science might eventually provide an account of the mind that would enable humans to set aside reference to mentalistic terms such as “belief” and “desire.” In the 1970s, his focus became issues in metaphilosophy. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty criticizes the idea that knowledge is a matter of mental or linguistic representation of the external world. Essays published in the 1970s and collected together in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) developed this view by bringing out its connections with the pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey. He came to identify more and more with pragmatism, in particular viewing his position as “continuous with Dewey’s.”​[5]​
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was extremely successful, attracting a readership not only in philosophy but also across the arts and humanities. Looking back at the book, however, Rorty lamented that it did not touch the question that had first led him to philosophy, of how to hold reality and justice in a single vision. In 1982 he took a post as professor of humanities at the University of Virginia, a position that provided him the opportunity to look beyond analytic philosophy. During his time there he published widely on both analytic and Continental philosophy, attempting to highlight parallels and connections he found between them. In 1989 he published Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. That book presupposes the account of language and knowledge presented in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature but is of far wider compass, drawing freely not only on figures in philosophy but also on novelists such as Proust, Nabokov, and Orwell. It also marks a significant change in Rorty’s view of the relationship between the private and the public, because in it he argues that there is no need to weave together one’s private passions and one’s social responsibilities. As he remarks, “This book tries to show how things look if we drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and private, and are content to treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally valid, yet forever incommensurable.”​[6]​
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity sketches what Rorty calls “the ideally liberal society.” In such a society, liberal institutions are seen as the product of historical contingencies that do not have, nor stand in need of, philosophical justification. The book was widely criticized for what many took to be the air of light-mindedness it adopts toward political questions. Rorty addresses this concern in subsequent essays and in his book Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. Published in 1998 shortly after he moved to Stanford University as professor of comparative literature, Achieving Our Country is an account of what Rorty takes to be the successes and failures of the American left, as well as suggestions for political action and social reform.
 A 	Liberalism as a Philosophical and a Political Project
Rorty is often identified with postmodernism. Although he once embraced the label, it is a description with which he grew unhappy, and in his later writings he distanced himself from it. One reason for this distance is that the term came to be used in so many different ways that it was simply unhelpful. Yet a more significant reason is that postmodernism, in the eyes of many, is associated with a rejection of the aspirations and legacy of the European Enlightenment. For Rorty the Enlightenment constitutes the single most significant contribution that philosophers have made to Western culture. Its importance lies in challenging the belief that respect and obedience are owed to traditional forms of authority, such as that of revealed religion. For the philosophers of the Enlightenment, authority itself needs to be vindicated through the exercise of reason.
Although committed to the Enlightenment, Rorty thinks it important to distinguish between what he regards as its two legacies: the philosophical and the political. These gave rise to two different sets of question. Philosophical questions concern the foundations of liberalism, specifically whether liberal institutions are justified by a source such as natural right or human nature. Political questions in contrast concern the desirability of liberal institutions and their advantages when compared to alternatives. Rorty’s thesis is that liberals can give up Enlightenment philosophy without endangering liberal institutions. He writes, “[A]bandoning Western rationalism has no discouraging political implications. It leaves the Enlightenment political project looking as good as ever.”​[7]​
By distinguishing between the philosophical and political elements of the Enlightenment, Rorty departs from classical liberalism. The liberals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempted to ground liberty in an account of natural right. Natural right was itself derived from different sources. Locke argued that natural right is guaranteed by God; Kant, that it involves a priori principles of reason. Yet in each case, liberal institutions were seen as resting on philosophical foundations, with government being justified insofar as it protects prepolitical rights (in particular, those of private property).
Rorty presents his own thoughts on liberalism not by examining the classical figures but by discussing more recent critics of liberalism. In their Dialectic of Enlightenment, critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno claim that the challenge the Enlightenment presented to traditional forms of authority came to undermine the convictions of the Enlightenment itself. As a result of its striving for emancipation through the exercise of critical reason, the Enlightenment came to show up the absence of its own foundations by undercutting notions of rationality and human nature. Horkheimer and Adorno conclude that liberalism thus deprived itself both of its philosophical foundations and its source of social cohesion, leaving it intellectually and morally bankrupt.
Rorty shares this understanding of Enlightenment philosophy. However, he thinks it a mistake to conclude that Enlightenment liberal institutions are thereby threatened. “Horkheimer and Adorno assumed that the terms in which those who begin a historical development described their enterprise remain the terms which describe it correctly, and then inferred that the dissolution of that terminology deprives the results of that development of the right to, or the possibility of, continued existence. This is almost never the case.”​[8]​ Rorty acknowledges the advances heralded by Enlightenment metaphysics, but thinks that metaphysics only a halfway measure. The rhetoric of figures such as Locke and Kant retained the religious need for human projects to be underwritten by a nonhuman authority. In his view, it is possible, and important, to go beyond them: “[T]he democracies are now in a position to throw away some of the ladders used in their own construction.”​[9]​
The connection that writers such as Horkheimer and Adorno see between the philosophical and the political projects of the Enlightenment may, Rorty claims, “reflect nothing more than a historical coincidence.”​[10]​ He also argues that the perceived need to identify philosophical foundations for liberal institutions is undesirable, because the search for foundations can potentially stand in the way of securing justice and freedom. Like Dewey, he argues that, although the classical liberals provided an important justification for freedom and toleration, their approach later came to stand in the way of necessary social reform. Dewey argued that the change in social conditions brought about by economic rights benefited some but created new relations of dependence for others. Rorty similarly argues that the emphasis placed on rights can be seen as conservative, enshrining the problems and beliefs of a particular time and place. For example, he notes that no less a liberal than Thomas Jefferson affirmed the absolute truth that all men are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights, but that he could do so while simultaneously owning slaves.​[11]​
In support of the suggestion that liberal institutions might be defended even while Enlightenment philosophy is set aside, Rorty discusses writers whom he takes successfully to have mounted just such a defense. He views Dewey, together with Michael Oakeshott, Isaiah Berlin, and John Rawls, as theorists who, in dispensing with Enlightenment rationalism, are able to offer a defense of liberal institutions stronger than that put forward by earlier figures. These theorists can be said to be pragmatists who sought to justify liberal institutions by drawing on the beliefs and practices of modern pluralist societies. Rorty proposes “that we see such writers as these as the self-canceling and self-fulfilling triumph of the Enlightenment. Their pragmatism is antithetical to Enlightenment rationalism, although it was itself made possible (in good dialectical fashion) only by that rationalism. It can serve as the vocabulary of a mature (de-scientized, de-philosophized) Enlightenment liberalism.”​[12]​
 A 	Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism
Rorty is a liberal, but what exactly does he mean by liberalism? We can best answer this question by locating his writings in the context of discussions in which he participated. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the central issue in Anglophone political theory was that which has become known as the liberal–communitarian debate. Prompted in part by the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971, writers such as Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Alasdair MacIntyre criticized liberalism for ignoring the particular contexts within which people live their lives. In different ways, they attacked what they took to be the undue emphasis that liberals place on individual rights and their related failure to attend to the particular circumstances of justice.
In his earliest writings in political theory, Rorty was sympathetic to communitarianism. In particular he wrote appreciatively of Sandel’s critique of Rawls’ Kantian idea of a self standing outside of culture and history. Rorty’s own Hegelian attempt to defend liberal institutions and practices without reference to Kantian notions of ahistoric rationality and morality was first outlined in a paper with the title “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism” (1983).​[13]​ By “bourgeois” he means the rights and freedoms that are (ideally) guaranteed in liberal democracies. By “postmodernist” he means a willingness to set aside the perceived need to provide a justification for those rights and freedoms of the kind sought by Kantian liberals such as Ronald Dworkin and (as he then thought) Rawls. Postmodernist bourgeois liberalism is historically contingent through and through, accepting that liberal institutions and practices are the products of particular circumstances and that our loyalties to them stem from nothing more than those contingencies.
Although Rorty came to regret associating himself with postmodernism, he never departed from his understanding of liberalism as being historically contingent. However, he did come to refine his understanding of both the communitarians on the one hand and Rawls on the other. In a paper written in 1984 titled “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” he presents communitarians like Sandel as maintaining “that liberal institutions and culture either should not or cannot survive the collapse of the philosophical justification that the Enlightenment provided for them.”​[14]​ As in his response to Horkheimer and Adorno, he contests the claim that liberalism stands or falls with the philosophical justifications that have been provided for it, arguing that there is no sense “in which liberal democracy ‘needs’ philosophical justification at all.” Although liberalism may “need philosophical articulation, it does not need philosophical backup.”​[15]​
The claim that liberal democracy does not require philosophical backup has alarmed those who think that, if we follow Rorty, nothing can be said to critics of liberalism.​[16]​ Yet this is to confuse two different claims. There is no justification of liberalism that will necessarily persuade every rational person, but this is not to claim that there is nothing to be said at all. Rorty writes, “I do not know how to ‘justify’ or ‘defend’ social democracy … in a large philosophical way (as opposed to going over the nitty-gritty advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives [critics of liberalism] propose).”​[17]​ Although a philosophical justification is unavailable, one can seek to justify liberalism by arguing for its concrete advantages. He suggests that the best way to do so is through invidious comparison: “[T]he justification of liberal society [is] simply … a matter of historical comparisons with other attempts at social organization – those of the past and those envisaged by utopians.”​[18]​
As he became more critical of communitarians such as Sandel, Rorty became more sympathetic to Rawls. He came to argue that Rawls presents the best contemporary philosophical articulation of liberalism. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls sets himself the task of outlining a theory of justice for modern societies. In later works, notably Political Liberalism, he addresses more explicitly the need for such a theory in order to secure political stability in the context of moral and religious diversity. According to Rawls, the pluralism of what he terms “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (specifically, moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines) means that public policy and institutions cannot legitimately be structured around any particular one. The “fact of pluralism,” the fact that there is a reasonable diversity of such doctrines, means that it would be unreasonable for any of them to be privileged in matters of public concern. Instead, he proposes what he calls a political conception of justice, in which the institutions and laws of modern societies are structured around a broadly liberal understanding developed out of the beliefs and values of reasonable citizens. Rawls explicitly distances this position from classical liberalism: “Political liberalism is not a form of Enlightenment liberalism, that is, a comprehensive liberal and often secular doctrine founded on reason.”​[19]​ Rather than drawing on controversial moral, theological, or philosophical premises, the political conception of justice is justified by reference to ideas that are embedded in the culture of contemporary liberal democracies.
In “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” Rorty endorses this political understanding of liberalism. That essay provides what he calls a historicist interpretation in which the Kantian side of Rawls is treated as a rhetorical flourish and in which the Hegelian, historicist, side is central. Rawls is taken to be addressing specific circumstances, specifically the legacy of the wars of religion following the Protestant Reformation. In a society that has come to accept, as Rawls puts it, that justice is its first virtue, no philosophical justification of the kind sought by the classical liberals will be needed. Rorty writes, “Such a society will become accustomed to the thought that social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation among individuals, individuals who find themselves heir to the same historical traditions and faced with the same problems.”​[20]​
If we grant Rorty’s interpretation, we can see him as answering a question that Rawls himself left hanging. In the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls remarks, “It is a great puzzle to me why political liberalism was not worked out much earlier: it seems such a natural way to present the idea of liberalism, given the fact of reasonable pluralism in political life. Does it have deep faults that preceding writers may have found in it that I have not seen and these led them to dismiss it?”​[21]​ We can imagine Rorty replying on his behalf that earlier liberals were working with a vocabulary that assumed liberalism needed justification by reference to Enlightenment reason, an assumption that we are only now learning to live without.
The strength of Rawls’s writings, according to Rorty, is that they address the particular circumstances of modern pluralist societies while avoiding the unattractive extremes of either relativism or of an Archimedean point outside of culture and history. He thinks of Rawls as offering a midway between these two alternatives in his suggestion that the principles of justice might be the subject of what he calls an “overlapping consensus.” Some commentators have thought that an overlapping consensus is merely a matter of comprehensive doctrines happening to agree on certain principles. Rorty disagrees, maintaining that in an overlapping consensus citizens do not endorse the principles of justice because their comprehensive doctrines already share them, but rather that it is the result of their actively seeking to work with holders of different such doctrines: “[A]n overlapping consensus is not the result of discovering that various comprehensive views already share common doctrines, but rather something that might never have emerged had the proponents of these views not started trying to cooperate.”​[22]​ There is no guarantee that an overlapping consensus will be secured, and it may be that what Rawls calls a “mere modus vivendi” is the most that can be achieved. However, ideally it will be possible to go beyond that to secure an overlapping consensus on a fair constitutional settlement.
 A 	Self-Creation and Irony
Rorty’s most sustained presentation of his thoughts on political theory is made in his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. There he concludes that his youthful desire to bring justice and beauty together into a single vision was mistaken and that both should be accommodated separately. This accommodation is realized in the “ideally liberal society,” one that gives up on the very idea of a single kind of human life. Such a society provides a set of rights under which individuals are treated equally in certain respects, leaving them free to pursue their ends within the framework provided by those rights, consistent with the enjoyment of those freedoms by other members of society who have different views of the good. As Rorty puts it, “J. S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people’s private lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word.”​[23]​
Rorty takes freedom to be a form of what Berlin called negative liberty, a matter of the absence of obstacles that interfere with one’s actions. In conceiving of freedom in this way, he departs from Dewey. Dewey was a proponent of greater citizen participation in democracy, arguing that an active community life is a prerequisite for individual freedom. In contrast Rorty expresses no attraction to a life of civic participation and distances himself from Dewey’s defense of participatory democracy.​[24]​ Although he describes himself as a Deweyan, he nowhere attends to the details of Dewey’s political writings and looks to other philosophers to exemplify the kind of freedom he has in mind. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, the most significant such philosopher is Nietzsche. Nietzsche is a philosopher of self-creation who identified the importance of appropriating and redescribing experiences rather than accepting inherited descriptions. As Rorty writes, “To create one’s mind is to create one’s own language, rather than to let the length of one’s mind be set by the language other human beings have left behind.”​[25]​
According to Rorty, the ideally liberal society is one in which citizens are free to create autonomous lives for themselves. He is careful, however, to distinguish the kind of autonomy he favors from that proposed by Kant. For Kant, autonomy is a matter of self-legislation in which one’s choices are made by reason and not influenced by experience. In contrast, the sense of autonomy Rorty favors is a matter of embracing contingency – in particular, of seeing one’s self and those things that are central to one’s identity as the result of such contingencies, and re-creating them through continual redescription.
Rorty examines these different understandings of autonomy by turning to Freud. Freud distinguished the ascetic life from the aesthetic life. The ascetic life concerns purity and is characterized by the attempt to purge from oneself all that is accidental and contingent in order to achieve a keener awareness of one’s true self. In contrast, the aesthetic life is marked not by purity but by self-enlargement, by “the development of richer, fuller ways of formulating one’s desires and hopes, and thus making those desires and hopes themselves – and thereby oneself – richer and fuller.”​[26]​ In place of the ascetic pursuit of true self, the aesthete embraces the creation of narratives within which she tells the story of her life. Rorty identifies self-creation with the aesthetic life, emphasizing that such a life depends on what it has inherited. Rather than seeing the autonomous person as inventing a wholly new world for herself, she should be seen as drawing on and redescribing what has gone before. On this point, Rorty departs from Nietzsche. There “can be no fully Niezschean lives, lives which are pure action rather than reaction – no lives which are not largely parasitical on an un-redescribed past and depending on the charity of as yet unborn generations.”​[27]​
The importance accorded by Rorty to self-creation through redescription is central to his claim that the citizens of the ideally liberal society will be “ironists.” Ironists place self-creation at the heart of their identity by standing in a specific relation with their “final vocabulary.” Such a vocabulary is final because the words of which it consists – “good,” “right,” “kindness,” etc. – cannot be backed up by noncircular argument. If the use of those words is questioned, the only response is to appeal to other beliefs whose justification depends at least partly on the belief being questioned.
I shall define an “ironist” as someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her final vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.​[28]​
Rather than seeking to purify herself from doubt, the ironist grasps the inescapability of contingency. She undertakes self-creation though redescription, but recognizes that there is no way to move beyond all description to what Rorty calls “Reality as It Is in Itself.”’​[29]​
The figure of the ironist has attracted considerable criticism, the two most significant charges being that irony is highly elitist​[30]​ and that it is incompatible with conviction, leading to the denigration of shared values and ways of life.​[31]​ 
The concern with elitism can in part be mitigated if we see that Rorty seeks to extend the life of self-creation to every citizen. Once again he illustrates how this might be accomplished by reference to Freud, who is said to democratize Nietzsche by showing how the detail of everyday life provides the material from which one might forge a life for oneself: “For Freud’s account of unconscious fantasy shows us how to see every human life as a poem – or, more exactly, every human life not so racked by pain as to be unable to learn a language nor so immersed in toil as to have no leisure in which to generate a self-description.”​[32]​
Irony is also said to preclude any committed engagement with social questions, because it encourages a detached, even sneering, attitude toward such questions. In Rorty’s view, however, the recognition of contingency need have no deleterious consequences for conviction. For if there is no such thing as a belief or conviction that swings free of contingency, recognizing its absence cannot alter the strength of our convictions. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity he writes that “the fundamental premise of this book is that a belief can still regulate action, can still be worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstances.”​[33]​ Elsewhere, he makes the point more strongly, suggesting that irony is not only consistent with moral and political conviction but might also positively enhance a certain kind of liberal toleration. Awareness that their beliefs are contingent can, he claims, make citizens less dogmatic and more willing to consider alternative descriptions: “It helps make the world’s inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, more receptive to the appeal of instrumental rationality.”​[34]​
 A 	Private Irony and Public Hope
Self-creation is one of the aims of ideal liberal society. The second aim concerns one’s responsibilities to one’s fellow citizens. Rorty captures this relation of responsibility with reference to a suggestion made by Judith Shklar, who defines liberals as people for whom “cruelty is the worst thing we do.”​[35]​ She contrasts cruelty with sin: Whereas sin is transgression against God, cruelty is a matter of inflicting pain on another human being. There is no inherent conflict between sin and cruelty, but someone who regards cruelty as the worst thing we do necessarily relegates sin to at most a secondary concern.​[36]​ Rorty takes up Shklar’s distinction between sin and cruelty by presenting liberals as people who take their duties to be owed exclusively to their fellow human beings.
In itself, the injunction to avoid cruelty tells us nothing about what cruelty might be or how it is to be avoided. Some commentators have thus pressed Rorty to provide a definition of cruelty.​[37]​ However, this request is not to the point. To specify cruelty’s necessary and sufficient conditions implies that we are in a position to give a definitive account of what is and is not cruel, but Rorty’s claim is that we are never in this position. Once again, his argument here recalls that of Dewey, who worried that liberal rights might enshrine new forms of injustice. Like Dewey, Rorty argues that liberal societies need to be constantly reminded of the ways in which the current arrangements of rights and freedoms have a negative impact on certain people.
The need for such a reminder is evidenced in Rorty’s view of Mill. Although Rorty thinks that the attempt to balance private interests and passions with social responsibilities constitutes the last word in political theory, he also thinks that the nature of that balance will vary according to circumstance. Thus, for example, he takes Rawls to have added to Mill the claim that the exercise of freedom requires economic redistribution.
Philosophers such as Mill and Rawls have a role to play in alerting us to cruelty, but Rorty thinks that more useful are those who sensitize us to the details of particular forms of suffering. These he calls “the specialists in particularity – historians, novelists, ethnographers, and muckraking journalists.”​[38]​ Such people bring into focus the details of particular lives. Novelists are especially helpful in this regard. Writers such as Nabokov and Dickens provide details of forms of cruelty (committed either by individuals or by institutions) that we had not previously considered, of cruelty inflicted on people with whom we may not have concerned ourselves.
Rorty has been widely challenged for his insistence on a firm distinction between the public and the private, which has been taken to ignore the feminist claim that “the personal is the political.”​[39]​ We should note, however, that he is not insisting on a categorical division between the private and the public, only that the one is often irrelevant for the other. Yet he recognizes that this is not always so. There is a role for ironic redescription in public life:
As I am a liberal, the part of my final vocabulary which is relevant to [public] actions requires me to become aware of all the various ways in which other human beings whom I might act upon can be humiliated. So the liberal ironist needs as much imaginative acquaintance with alternative final vocabularies as possible, not just for her own edification, but in order to understand the actual and possible humiliation of the people who use these alternative final vocabularies.​[40]​
By way of illustration, Rorty points out that, having secured women the vote, the American left forgot the ways in which women continued to suffer prejudice. To overcome this prejudice, society needed to be redescribed so that “the male-female distinction is no longer of much interest.”​[41]​ He applauds feminists for having exposed hitherto unrecognized instances of cruelty and thus expanding the frontiers of our imaginations and moral world.
Rorty’s political writings are not limited to political theory and its relationship to imaginative literature. In pieces written for journals such as The Nation and The New Republic he makes concrete suggestions for social and institutional reform. In his 1998 book Achieving Our Country he proposes what he called a “People’s Charter.” At the top of his list of suggestions is reform of campaign financing.​[42]​ He also proposes universal health insurance, public financing of primary and secondary education, and dramatically increased rates of income tax to pay for these programs.​[43]​
In his contributions to public debate, Rorty’s immediate focus is contemporary America. However, his hopes are not limited to the United States but extend beyond both America and the European democracies. As he remarks, the historicist account of liberalism he offers in no way entails giving up on the “attempt to build a cosmopolitan world-society – one which embodies the same sort of utopia with which the Christian, Enlightenment, and Marxist metanarratives of emancipation ended.”​[44]​ Rorty himself epitomizes the notion of the liberal ironist, ready to reread and revise the thinkers he encounters in order to offer redescriptions of issues in political theory and political life.
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